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MISSION AND INSTALLATION CONTRACTING COMMAND 
SERVICES ACQUISTION: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ARMY 




The overall purpose of this research is to develop a comprehensive understanding of how the 
Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) manages the acquisition of 
services.  The specific objective of the project is to build on the understanding developed in 
prior research projects and to identify the factors that promote or obstruct the use of best 
practices in acquisition management and influence the efficiency and effectiveness of service 
contracts performance.  In this study, data was collected from eight Army installation 
contracting offices. The study is meant to serve as a follow-on project for research conducted 
at additional Mission and Installation Contracting Command offices.  In prior research 
projects, researchers showed a relationship between service type and contract characteristics 
and management practices as well as a relationship between capacity and management 
practices.  The current study confirms the findings of previous researchers and provides 
recommendations for improving performance of service contracts through enhanced 
capabilities and acquisition processes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Services acquisitions in the Department of Defense (DoD) have received a lot of 
attention over the past decade due to the significant increase in scope and dollars.  DoD 
service contracting in 2010 added up to more than $200 billion (in constant dollars), which is 
almost over 50% of the total DoD acquisition budget (Defense Science Board [DSB], 2011).  
A 2002 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that the DoD spent $53 
billion in services during fiscal year (FY) 2000.  Therefore, from 2000 to 2010, there was an 
increase of over $147 billion (current-year dollars) in DoD services acquisitions.  
Additionally, the Acquisition Advisory Panel stated in its January 2007 report that the DoD’s 
acquisition workforce had declined by nearly 50% since the 1990s.  Despite efforts to hire 
personnel, there remains an acute shortage of federal procurement professionals with 
between five and 15 years of experience (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2008).  
An increase in requirements and a decrease in qualified personnel indicates that the DoD may 
struggle to ensure that contracted services are delivered according to the cost, quality, and 
quantity specified in the contract (GAO, 2008).  
Since 2001 government and non-government agencies have conducted numerous 
assessments of improvements in the procurement and oversight of services by the DoD.  
Most assessments have revealed and continue to reveal many areas requiring improvement, 
calling for the need to reform procurement and oversight of services acquisition.  
Furthermore, another important motive for reform is the current budget crisis the United 
States is facing. Since 1960, Congress has acted 78 separate times to permanently raise, 
temporarily extend, or revise the definition or amount of the debt limit (Department of 
Treasury, 2011).   
The president’s 2012 budget recognizes that the United States cannot rebuild its 
economy and “win the future” if the American people pass on a mountain of debt to their 
children and grandchildren (Office of Management and Budget [OMB], n.d., para. 1). The 
President of the United States (POTUS) and Congress are making efforts to restore fiscal 
responsibility and reform the government to make it more effective, efficient, and open to the 
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American people (OMB, n.d.).  One action specific to this initiative in the 2010 National 
Security Strategy, issued by the POTUS, Barack Obama, called for the reform of acquisition 
and contracting processes, in which the DoD accounts for 70% of all federal procurement 
spending (Office of the POTUS, 2010).  As a result, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also 
addressed the need for reform in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, 
calling for a change in how the DoD does business and how it buys (DoD, 2010).  In a 
speech given on January 6, 2011, Gates announced his plan to find at least $100 billion in 
savings that the DoD could keep and shift to higher priority programs through an effort to get 
better value and results in the contracting arena for defense goods and services (Gates, 2011).  
His statements echoed the importance of the budgetary guidance and concerns from the 
White House and Congress.  The “Department of Defense Efficiency Initiatives” is aimed at 
“generating efficiency savings by reducing overhead costs, improving business practices, or 
culling excess or trouble programs” (Gates, 2011, para. 2).  In response to this initiative, 
USD(AT&L) Ashton B. Carter has taken action to demand acquisition reform.  
B. USD(AT&L) RESPONSE 
In an effort to answer Secretary Gates’ call for reform, USD(AT&L) Carter issued a 
memo dated June 28, 2010, mandating that the DoD “DO MORE WITHOUT MORE” 
(USD[AT&L], 2010, p. 1).  In the memo, USD(AT&L) Carter established guidance for 
achieving greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending.  His Better Buying Power 
memorandum revealed 23 actions to improve efficiency in five target areas.  The five major 
areas include the following: (1) target affordability and control cost growth, (2) incentivize 
productivity and innovation in industry, (3) promote real competition, (4) improve tradecraft 
in services acquisition, and (5) reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy 
(USD[AT&L], 2010).   
In this research, we focus on the fourth target area, improving tradecraft in services 
acquisition.  The goal for improvement in this area centers around the following four tenets: 
(1) create a senior manager for acquisition of services in each component, (2) adopt uniform 
taxonomy for different types of services, (3) address causes of poor tradecraft in services 
acquisition, and (4) increase small business participation in providing services (USD[AT&L], 
2010).  USD(AT&L) Carter’s vision is critical to acquire proper, reliable services that meet 
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mission needs and strongly encourage fiscal responsibility.  Congress and the DoD are 
emphasizing how critical it is to deliver better value to the taxpayers and to improve the way 
the DoD conducts business.  
The DoD is the largest buyer of services in the federal government (McFall & La, 
2011).  The Defense Science Board (DSB) stated that “today, almost every defense task that 
is not an inherently governmental function is carried out in some part through contracted 
services” (DSB, 2011, p. vii).  In a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
report, researchers revealed that out of three categories in defense spending, services grew 
the fastest at 6.1% per year over the course of 21 years (CSIS, 2011).  Specifically, the 
Army’s spending on contracts for services grew at an amazing 13% per year between 2002 
and 2010, as seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.   DoD Contract Spending on Services by Component, 1990–2010 
(CSIS, 2011, p. 11) 
Figure 2 illustrates Army contract spending by category from 1990 to 2010 and 
reveals that spending on contracts for services increased far more rapidly than spending for 
products (CSIS, 2011, p. 11).  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to have had a huge 
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effect on contract spending for the Army.  Service contracting for the Army accounted for 
45% to 53% of all Army contract spending every year after September 11, 2001.  
 
Figure 2.   Army Contract Spending by Category, 1990–2010 
(CSIS, 2011, p. 20) 
Thus far, we have established the importance of improving DoD acquisition and have 
demonstrated senior leadership support within the DoD for acquisition reform. With this 
support, it is up to the individual military Services to take action and work together to 
implement contract efficiencies.  This attempt to streamline contracting efficiencies within 
the DoD leads to the topic of this research report: specifically, an analysis of the management 
of service contracts in the Army. 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The overall purpose of this research is to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
how the Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) manages the 
acquisition of services.  Thomas McFall and Dennis La (2011) developed and used the data 
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collection form (see Appendix A) in a pilot study to collect empirical data regarding the 
current state of services acquisition management at the installation level within the Army in 
order to conduct a follow-on analysis of collected data.  Our study builds on prior research 
and specifically expands upon McFall and La’s effort by increasing the database and 
applying the same model developed in their 2011 Master of Business Administration (MBA) 
report.  In this study, we build upon identifying factors that influence the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service contracts performance.  Moreover, our research is an in-depth study 
of the acquisition of services in the Army and the drivers of acquisition management 
practices.  Our research revolves around four main objectives:  
 Build on the understanding developed in prior research projects and develop a 
data collection instrument that will identify the factors that promote or 
obstruct the use of best practices in acquisition management. 
 Provide recommendations to help improve efficiency and effectiveness in 
service contracts performance, geared toward savings in the tail end of 
military operations. 
 Assess how the data collection form can be improved to apply this study 
across all Army MICC centers and Directorates of Contracting (DOCs) in 
future research.  
 Create teaching materials for Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) instructors in 
acquisition and contracting courses.    
Figure 3 illustrates the importance of understanding the drivers of acquisition 
management practices in order to improve the performance of service contracts.   
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Figure 3.   Conceptual Model: Drivers of Acquisition Practices and Performance 
(Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2010b, p. 4) 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In an effort to build on prior research, we attempt to answer the same questions used 
in the McFall and La MBA project.  The three major research questions that relate to services 
acquisition within the Army MICC are as follows: 
 Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
 Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices being 
used?   
 Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used?   
E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
Our research focus is to understand and analyze the drivers of service contracting 
practices and performance to help improve the acquisition of services in the Army MICC.  
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Additionally, in this research we reveal a more in-depth understanding of contract 
characteristics for different types of services, and we demonstrate how management practices 
affect the type of service being acquired, as well as the capacity for carrying out the related 
work. Also, we build upon and corroborate the results found in previous studies of the 
acquisition of services. Our overall intent is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
meeting service requirements through contracting. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The broad scope of the acquisition of services is a limitation of this research.  The 
sample size of data that we used in this research is minuscule compared to the number of 
services the Army MICC acquires in terms of type of services, number of contracting offices, 
and number of service contracts.  For instance, the Army uses the Federal Procurement Data 
System (FPDS), which describes over 20 different product service codes (PSCs) that 
categorize the type of services being acquired; our research focuses on only four PSCs. Of 
the four PSCs we analyzed in this study, two are considered complex and two are considered 
simple, based on their respective requirements. Throughout our report the term PSC and 
service type will be used interchangeably.  
Additionally, Army MICC contracting activities include six contracting centers and 
36 DOCs; however, we used only two contracting centers and four DOCs to collect data for 
this study.  Furthermore, of the six contracting offices we visited, we collected and combined 
data from 114 service contracts with the data of 40 service contracts from McFall and La’s 
2011 study, for a total of 154 service contracts for analysis.  This is a small sample size 
considering that the command awards more than 260,000 contracts each year (Army 
Contracting Command [ACC], 2011b).   
Finally, numerous players are involved in the acquisition process, and the contracting 
officer is just one part of the entire team; in our research, we do not capture all the other 
players involved in the process.  As was the case in previous reports similar to ours, because 
of the limited sample size of our study, we may have been unable to identify some drivers of 
management practices and performance in services acquisition, or we may have captured 
some that are not important.  We discuss the drivers that may not be captured in Chapters IV 
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and V of this report and recommend further studies to supplement the limitations of this 
research project. 
G. METHODOLOGY 
We conducted this research by collecting contract and management practice data 
from six MICC installations, focusing on collecting objective-based data.  In collecting our 
data for this project, we used the data collection form (see Appendix A) developed in the 
McFall and La (2011) MBA report. The data collection form is geared toward achieving the 
objectives and answering the research questions that we presented in Sections C and D of this 
chapter.  McFall and La conducted a pilot study that evaluated 40 service contracts at two 
MICC installations.  In our research, we employed the lessons learned from the pilot in order 
to expand the data collection at six other MICC offices.  We analyzed the collected data 
quantitatively and qualitatively to draw conclusions about management practices at a total of 
eight MICC centers.  That analysis includes data from the two MICC installations McFall 
and La used in the pilot project and six others that we visited for this report. 
H. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report is made up of six chapters.  Chapter I includes background information, 
the USD(AT&L) response, the purpose of the research, research questions, the benefits of the 
research, the limitations of the research, and the research methodology.  In Chapter II, a 
literature review, we examine documentation and research published with regard to the 
DoD’s acquisition management process and reform initiatives.  In the literature review, we 
also cover public management reform, history of service contracts, service contract 
management, acquisition workforce training, and previously completed research.  In Chapter 
II, we explore prior research papers in order to determine how our study will help further 
those studies.  In Chapter III, we present the mission and organization of the MICC.  In 
Chapter IV, we describe the research methodology in more detail.  We outline the procedures 
for collecting data and explain how it will be analyzed.  In Chapter V, we examine the 
collected data and present the findings of the analysis to help answer our three research 
questions.  In Chapter VI, we summarize the research, which includes responses to the 
research questions, recommendations to the Army MICC on acquisition management 
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practices, ways to improve the data collection and application of this research to other DoD 
contracting units, and areas to consider for further research in the field of services 
acquisition. 
I. SUMMARY 
Our purpose in this chapter was to provide background knowledge of the acquisition 
of services within the DoD and to highlight the effect of acquisition reform.  Furthermore, we 
provided information on the importance of improving the management and practices used in 
services acquisition to achieve better value and results in the contracting arena for defense 
goods and services.  Ultimately, we revealed how improving services acquisition can create 
efficiencies that will help support the United States’ financial and national security.  In 
Chapter II, we review prior literature relevant to the acquisition of services within the DoD.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
In order to present a foundation for this research, we examined documentation and 
research published with respect to the DoD’s acquisition management process and reform 
initiatives, with specific attention given to services acquisition.  Our purpose was to continue 
McFall and La’s (2011) efforts and to discuss current and relevant sources that contribute to 
the basis of this research.  In this literature review, we first discuss public management 
reform and the present efforts to streamline the DoD’s acquisition policies and processes.  
Second, we review the financial impact and the reliance of service contracts in the DoD.  
Third, we review service contract management, the relevant issues affecting acquisition 
processes, and the lack of specific training for the procurement of services and its effect on 
the acquisition workforce.  Finally, we introduce a summary of previous NPS Acquisition 
Research Program (ARP) projects associated with service contracting as the basis for this 
project.   
B. PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
The mission and structure of the DoD continually changes in order to meet the intent 
of the current national security strategy.  In order to provide the products and services 
necessary to accomplish the objectives associated with this strategy, the DoD must also 
introduce acquisition reform to ensure compliance with corresponding budgets, as well as 
with current laws and acts passed by Congress. 
The DoD contracts out certain functions and relies on contractors to perform services 
for numerous reasons.  In the early 2000s, the DoD realized that it needed to modernize its 
forces in order to improve its capabilities and maintain a military advantage.  With outdated 
equipment and a reduction in troop strength, the DoD’s top budgetary concern was 
procurement funding for new systems, which included products and associated services to 
develop and sustain.  According to a DoD news release detailing the budget for FY 2000, 
leadership in the DoD considered “higher modernization spending to be essential to the 
future readiness and battlefield superiority of U.S. forces” (DoD, 1999, para. 5).  At the time, 
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the DoD’s push for modernization drove budgetary decision-making.  Greve (2008) argued 
that the reason for contracting changes over time, and sometimes innovation is a priority over 
saving money.  Since 2001 the vision for a future combat force has been a priority, and 
obtaining the necessary funds from Congress has been essential.   
 Over the past decade, the need for modernization, especially evident as a result of the 
Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, has permitted the DoD to become accustomed to receiving 
ample budgets from Congress, with generous increases each year.  The DoD’s budget in FY 
2011 was more than double the budget in FY 2001.  Figure 4 represents the department’s 
top-line trend for the past decade. 
 
Figure 4.   Department of Defense Top Line 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller [OUSD(C)], 2010) 
The introduction of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 1994 
encouraged a reduced acquisition workforce based on the expectation of the streamlining 
process, including foreseeing an increased reliance on credit cards (DoDIG, 2000).  The huge 
cut in the workforce, as a result of the streamlining process, coupled with the continuous 
growth of the procurement budget, eventually led to an overworked and insufficiently trained 
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workforce, which we discuss later in this chapter in Section C, and to the need for major 
reform.  Figure 5 illustrates the decrease in the DoD acquisition workforce compared to the 
increase in the procurement budget. 
 
Figure 5.   Department of Defense Acquisition Trends 
(Spisak, 2011, p. 127) 
Starting in the early 2000s, increased budgets provided the DoD with the opportunity 
to contract out more goods and services, at home and abroad, in order to support the overall 
mission.  As of 2011, contracts awarded by the DoD have nearly doubled since 2001.  
Consequently, the amount of dollars the DoD has obligated has outgrown other DoD outlays 
(CSIS, 2011).  As a result, the DoD’s reliance on contracted goods and services to conduct 
daily business increased considerably.  The DoD’s top-line contract spending for the past two 
decades is illustrated in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.   Top-Line DoD Contract Spending, 1990–2010 
(CSIS, 2011) 
In a statement delivered in January 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
announced the necessity for altering the way the department conducts business, specifically 
its spending habits.  His statement reflected the stance of the department in response to 
budgetary guidance and concerns from the White House and Congress.  In an effort to 
streamline costs and reduce waste, Secretary Gates’ reform agenda introduced the 
Efficiencies Initiative that scrutinizes spending without sacrificing readiness  (Gates, 2011).  
As we mentioned in Chapter I, USD(AT&L) Carter published a memorandum 
establishing guidance for obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending in 
response to Secretary Gates’ initiative.  His September 2010 Better Buying Power 
memorandum highlighted 23 actions to improve efficiency in five target areas (USD[AT&L], 
2010).  
Specific to our research is USD(AT&L) Carter’s fourth target area, improving 
tradecraft in services acquisition (USD[AT&L], 2010).  For each tenet, USD(AT&L) Carter 
issued explicit directives in order to guide the acquisition workforce towards the 
improvement of procuring services.  Particularly relevant to our research is the second tenet, 
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adopting a uniform taxonomy for different types of services.  Currently, there is limited 
regulatory guidance that addresses services in general or the approach necessary to handle 
service contracts.  The Army, for instance, published Army Regulation (AR) 70-13 in July 
2010, a short 13-page broad brushstroke of how to manage and oversee services acquisitions.  
While necessary, this is the only specific guidance the Army has for procuring services, 
which happens to be very similar to the process for procuring goods. 
An article published by Vernon Edwards (2010) challenged some of the directives 
that USD(AT&L) Carter issued, specifically with respect to the tradecraft in the services 
target area.  In response to the new services taxonomy tenet, Edwards acknowledged that 
there is “no good theory, set of principles, or terminology for the specifications of services” 
(Edwards, 2010, p. 3).  He argued that of all government agencies, the DoD spends the most 
on services and has the most experience with procuring services, but it has not consolidated 
and organized that knowledge in order to effectively manage it.  Contracting offices have 
simply not properly captured the DoD’s experience with procuring services, nor have they 
used the lessons learned to build a foundation for services acquisition regulation.  
With most public agencies, reform is necessary as time progresses and events shape 
the way the government conducts business.  However, certain initiatives may unknowingly 
create future problems.  For example, Greve (2008) concluded that public agencies rely on 
contracting out services because of prior reform initiatives.  The sheer complexity of the Iraq 
and Afghanistan conflicts has highlighted the need for acquisition reform, not only for 
contingency operations, but for home installation operations as well.  Furthermore, Snider 
and Rendon (2008) have discussed how some procurement reform initiatives, such as the 
FASA, resulted in less-than-desirable procurement outputs, outcomes, or impacts.  While the 
DoD as a whole has made positive efforts in finding solutions to services acquisition 
challenges, there is still an essential need for continued improvement. 
C. SERVICE CONTRACTS 
In this section we discuss the understated considerations of service contracting, given 
its substantial impact on the budget.  The magnitude and effect of service contracting on the 
DoD’s operations is immense, yet regulations and guidance for service contracting is weak. 
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Across the DoD, the amount of dollars obligated for service contracts has 
considerably increased since 2000.  As the DSB Task Force on Improvements to Services 
Contracting revealed, over $200 billion (in real dollars)—more than 50% of the DoD 
budget—was allocated for service contracting in 2010 (DSB, 2011).  As a result of the 
reduction of forces in the early 1990s and the unexpected scale of the global war on 
terrorism, the DoD’s reliance on services became critical to the mission.  As presented by the 
CSIS Defense Contract Trends report (CSIS, 2011), spending on services surpassed spending 
for products and research and development, at a rate of 6.1% per year over the past two 
decades.  Figure 7 illustrates this trend. 
 
Figure 7.   DoD Contract Spending for Services, 1990–2010 
(CSIS, 2011) 
Not surprisingly, the DoD annual procurement obligations far exceeded those of other 
government agencies.  The department as a whole realized a significant increase in the 
amount of service dollars obligated.  Specifically, the Army significantly increased its 
reliance on service contracting and experienced a far greater rate of growth for service 
contracting compared to the Navy and Air Force (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.   DoD Total Contract Spending for Fiscal Year 2010 
(Spruill, 2011) 
Accounting for between 45% and 53% of all spending since 2001, service contracts 
continue to be pivotal to the Army’s mission (CSIS, 2011).  More notably, the Army’s 
increased reliance on service contracts is in large part a result of the Army’s response to the 
Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, for forward operations, as well as home station operations.  
Contractor support is as essential to supporting forward operations as it is to maintaining 
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Figure 9.   Army Contract Spending by Category, 1990–2010 
(CSIS, 2011) 
The type of services purchased greatly defines the impact of contracted services on 
the DoD and their significance.  A vast majority of the DoD’s services are grouped into 24 
PSCs, which represent how service contracts are categorized and accounted for.  We 
intended to continue the research initiated by McFall and La (2011) and to collect additional 
data in order to analyze the use of service contracts in the Army.  In order to maintain data 
integrity, we focused our data collection on four of the 24 PSCs, which represent common 
services across Army installations and accounted for over 60% of the service contracts in 
terms of dollar value for FY 2009 (McFall & La, 2011).  Table 1 lists the 24 PSCs and their 
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Table 1.   Breakdown of Service Contracts in the Army for FY 2009 
(McFall & La, 2011) 





R 11,674,519,717 27.4% Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services 
J 7,645,271,950 18.0% Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment 
A 6,472,306,540 15.2% Research and Development 
S 5,015,441,637 11.8% Utilities and Housekeeping Services 
U 1,909,983,556 4.5% Education and Training Services 
D 1,689,891,641 4.0% Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunication Services 
C 1,557,067,711 3.7% Architect and Engineering Services—Construction  
B 1,247,897,017 2.9% Special Studies and Analyses—Not R&D 
M 1,160,055,305 2.7% Operation of Government-Owned Facility 
Y 897,151,344 2.1% Construction of Structures and Facilities 
Q 489,328,909 1.1% Medical Services 
V 455,413,266 1.1% Transportation, Travel, and Relocation Services 
Z 454,447,794 1.1% Maintenance, Repair, or Alteration of Real Property 
F 394,962,703 0.9% Natural Resources Management 
L 353,565,935 0.8% Technical Representative Services 
K 237,852,282 0.6% Modification of Equipment 
W 208,523,670 0.5% Lease or Rental of Equipment 
O 201,915,384 0.5% Other 
N 183,192,192 0.4% Installation Equipment 
G 155,301,816 0.4% Social Services 
P 90,103,239 0.2% Salvage Services 
H 45,398,154 0.1% Quality Control, Testing, and Inspection Services 
T 25,816,540 0.1% Photographic, Mapping, Printing, and Publication Services 
E 6,270,563 <1.0% Purchase of Structures and Facilities 
X 1,680,844 <1.0% Lease or Rental of Facilities 
Total 42,573,359,708 100.0%  
 
The selected service codes for data collection were the following: 
 PSC R (Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services), 
 PSC J (Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment Services),  
 PSC S (Utilities and Housekeeping Services), and 
 PSC D (Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services). 
In keeping with the model developed by McFall and La (2011), we sustained the 
following considerations:   
 PSC A (Research and Development) and PSC U (Education and Training) 
would not be used because they are not common services across all military 
installations.   
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 PSCs R and D represent complex-type services that require unique skills and 
are more difficult to define than simple-type services. 
 PSCs J and S represent simple-type services.   
Overall, service contracts in the DoD are unique and vary in scope and size.  Detailed 
guidance for the procurement of services does not exist.  Compared to the procurement of 
goods or systems, the GAO found that the reasons services differ from products can be 
attributed to the fact that services are less homogenous, more numerous, and harder to 
measure (GAO, 2009).  Yet, current laws and regulations and training for the acquisition 
workforce are primarily directed at the procurement of goods, not services.  In Section D of 
this chapter, we discuss the lack of management and oversight for service contracts, and the 
effect on the acquisition process and workforce.  
D. SERVICE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
With the realization that service contracting commands a huge portion of the defense 
budget, we can easily identify and magnify the inefficiencies and problems with defense 
service contract procedures.  At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the DSB created a 
task force to conduct an independent assessment of procurement oversight and procedures for 
services in the DoD.  In March 2011, the task force’s report was published and provided 
insights and guidance for improving DoD policies, and procedures for procuring services.  
The task force identified five key findings in its assessment: 
 Contracts for services supported major DoD programs and their major 
associated administrative, technological, and logistics services and were a 
strategic component of all military operations. 
 Buying services was fundamentally different from buying weapons systems, 
yet most current acquisition regulations, laws, policies, processes, standards, 
training, education, and management structures were focused on optimizing 
the characteristics of products. 
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 The DoD urgently needed to establish a meaningful taxonomy for services in 
order to develop useful definitions, performance standards, and outcome 
measures for each type of service. 
 New and more detailed guidance was needed in the DoD that clarified the 
inherently governmental functions that government personnel should always 
perform. (DSB, 2011) 
With these findings, the task force portrayed the complexity of service contracting 
due to the absence of structured rules and laws focused specifically on managing service 
contracts, combined with an acquisition workforce that was inadequately trained.  Most 
relevant to our research are the second, third, and fourth findings.  All offices and 
departments within the DoD must understand the differences between purchasing services 
versus products, and understand the efforts that must be taken to award and manage a service 
contract.  In order to do so, the DoD must update and tailor policies and procedures for 
service contracting. The recommendation of the task force focused on “setting definitions 
and standards for services, making decisions to retain organic capacity or contract for 
services, and setting effective processes and policies to guide services contracting” (DSB, 
2011).  As portrayed in Figure 8, approximately 55% of the DoD’s annual contracts for FY 
2010 were for services, yet the DoD has not defined policies to adequately manage them. 
More important, the acquisition workforce must be knowledgeable in order to 
understand the requirements of and administer the process for a service contract.  The DSB 
Task Force also highlighted the fact that acquisition training programs lacked any form of 
education on service contracting (DSB, 2011).  Additionally, the Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations pointed out that the 
Army acquisition workforce was already challenged with staying current with basic training 
and certifications, let alone any services-specific training (Gansler et al., 2007).  However, in 
order to support the Army’s Grow the Army initiative, the objective for Army acquisition 
was to provide an “agile, right-sized, right skilled acquisition workforce to support the 
Army’s growth and transformation” (Defense Acquisition Workforce [DAW], 2010, p. A9-
2).  In order to align with the Army’s strategy, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]) incorporated five key objectives to 
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support its mission and vision for the reinforcement of its workforce.  Figure 10 depicts the 
five strategic objectives. 
 
Figure 10.   Key ASA(ALT) Strategic Objectives (Ends) 
(DAW, 2010, p. A9-3) 
In accordance with Secretary Gates’ initiative and USD(AT&L) Carter’s Better 
Buying Power criteria, the Army still faces challenges with properly executing service 
contracts, but it has taken strong steps toward implementing a strategy to reconcile these 
issues.  
Consistent with the findings of the DSB Task Force, several GAO reports have 
reported similar findings and recommendations.  In 2007 a GAO report focusing on the 
improvement of management and oversight for services acquisitions argued that the DoD did 
not completely grasp whether its services acquisition processes were working, or whether 
these processes accurately supported its mission and protected taxpayer interests (GAO, 
2007).  The unique mission of the DoD requires varying types of services, which have 
varying durations and requirements, which have made it difficult to adequately capture 
whether current practices are functioning to meet the DoD’s needs.  A 2009 GAO report 
followed up with this concern, citing poorly defined or changing requirements as the reason 
services did not meet the DoD’s needs, largely because of the absence of clear requirements 
(GAO, 2009).   
In 2009 the GAO examined the DoD’s reliance on contractors for services to the 
point where “DoD officials have acknowledged their inability to perform their mission 
without contract support” (GAO, 2009, p. 1).  While the GAO did not argue that the DoD 
should not contract out services, it contended that the department needed to improve upon the 
oversight of service contracts, a key factor in the proper handling of service contracts.   
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E. PREVIOUSLY COMPLETED RESEARCH 
This research ultimately stems from a series of five ARP-sponsored research projects 
focusing on services acquisition in the DoD.  McFall and La (2011) based their research on 
the conclusions and recommendations of the following series of research projects. In the first 
services research (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis, & Rendon, 2006) and in the second services research 
(Apte & Rendon, 2007), the authors examined the types of services the DoD acquired to 
understand the respective growth rate and possible opportunities and challenges faced in the 
service supply chain. The third phase of services research (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2008) and 
the fourth phase (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2009) were empirical studies and incorporated 
survey-based data collection in order to determine how services acquisitions were managed 
at Army, Navy, and Air Force installations.  In the surveys, researchers focused on collecting 
information regarding contract characteristics, acquisition management methods, and other 
program management issues.  These studies concluded that services acquisition management 
lacks a strong management approach, sufficient training of acquisition personnel, and 
necessary manning levels.  In the fifth services research (Apte, Apte, & Rendon, 2010a), the 
researchers focused on analyzing the data compiled from the third and fourth services 
research studies in order to understand how individual agencies within the DoD manage 
services acquisition.  They concluded that most of the service contracts were competitive, 
fixed-price contracts, managed at the regional level in the Navy and by the project team in 
the Army and Air Force, and none of the services utilized project life cycles for services 
acquisition.    
As we stated in our introduction, this research is a continuation of McFall and La’s 
(2011) research in which they examined services acquisition within the Army.  Their efforts 
focused on the development of a model that effectively assessed the services acquisition 
procedures of Army MICCs by collecting data from two Army MICC offices.  Using the 
same model and data collection procedures, we focus on collecting data from an additional 
six Army MICCs in an effort to conduct a more detailed analysis of a larger sample.   
F. SUMMARY  
Our intent in this chapter was to present the basis for our current research.  We 
introduced and discussed previous research and administrative directives for DoD services 
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acquisition management.  In our review, we depicted the complex nature of services 
acquisitions and the challenges they present to the DoD and to the Army MICC 
organizations.  In the next chapter, we present the organization of the Army Contracting 
Command and its associated MICCs. 
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III. MISSION AND INSTALLATION CONTRACTING COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we focus on the history and current state of Army contracting.  First, 
we explore acquisition failures that have been identified by an independent commission on 
Army acquisitions, the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations, also commonly referred to as the Gansler Commission, appointed 
by the Secretary of the Army.  Second, we present readers with an explanation of why the 
Army Contracting Command (ACC) was established.  Third, we explore the ACC’s 
organizational structure and the relationship between the MICC and the ACC.  Last, we 
provide an overview of the MICC’s purpose, mission, and organizational structure. 
B. ARMY CONTRACTING CONCERNS 
In 2007 the Secretary of the Army formed the Gansler Commission to review lessons 
learned in recent operations and provide recommendations to ensure that future military 
operations will have greater effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency. The commission 
found that the Army lacked the leadership and personnel to provide adequate contracting 
support to either expeditionary or peacetime operations.  Since 1995 Army contracting 
personnel have faced a more than 350% increase in contract actions, a 382% increase in 
dollars spent, and a stunning 53% decrease in acquisition workforce, as illustrated in Figure 
11.  Meanwhile they are performing more complex actions than ever before (Gansler et al., 
2007, p. 32).  
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Figure 11.   The Army Materiel Command Contracting Statistics for 1995–2006 
(Gansler et al., 2007, p. 32) 
Furthermore, in the report the commission revealed that only 3% of Army contracting 
personnel were military.  Due to the lack of military contracting professionals, the Army was 
unable to fill military or civilian contracting billets in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a result, the 
Air Force provided over 67% of the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–
I/A) contracting resources (Gansler et al., 2007, p. 93). 
The Gansler Commission identified a significant number of proposed changes to 
improve Army acquisition and program management in expeditionary operations. 
Additionally, the commission proposed the following four overarching recommendations to 
achieve success in the future:  
 Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian 
contracting. 
 Restructure the organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting 
and contract management in expeditionary and continental United States 
(CONUS) operations. 
 Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary 
operations. 
 Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness in expeditionary operations. (Gansler et al., 2007, pp. 47–58) 
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These four recommendations led to the establishment of the ACC.  In order to 
restructure the organization and make possible effective and efficient contracting and 
contract management, the Gansler Commission proposed a reorganization of contracting 
responsibilities, as depicted in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.   Recommended Army Contracting Organizations and Responsibilities 
(Gansler et al., 2007, p. 51) 
C. ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND MISSION AND ORGANIZATION 
In compliance with the Gansler Commission, on October 1, 2008, the Army 
recognized the formal establishment of the ACC as a major subordinate command of the 
Army Materiel Command (AMC; ACC, 2011a). The new command performs the majority of 
all contracting work for the Army and consists of two subordinate commands: the 
Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) and the MICC.  
The mission of the ACC is to “provide global contracting support to warfighters 
through the full spectrum of military operations” (ACC, 2011a, para. 1).  The ACC vision is 
“a professional workforce providing quality contracting solutions in support of our 
warfighters” (ACC, 2011a, para. 2).  The ACC reports directly to the AMC.  Figure 13 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 28 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
reveals the current ACC organizational structure.  In line with the recommendations from the 
Gansler Commission, the reorganization allows for better oversight and management of 
contingency contracting, program management, and installation contracting.  As Figure 13 
illustrates, a two-star general leads the ACC, and a one-star general leads the ECC and 
MICC, which suggests the importance of reform to the Army.  The MICC specifically 
controls installation contracting in the CONUS with 36 DOCs and six regional contracting 
centers within its chain of command (ACC, 2011a).  The ECC is in charge of all contingency 
contracting operations for the Army with seven Contract Support Brigades to support the 
warfighters (ACC, 2011a).  Furthermore, there are nine program management offices that 
support the development of new systems for the Army.  
 
Figure 13.   U.S. Army Contracting Command Organizational Chart 
(Jones, Klaft, & Pettygrue, 2010, p. 24) 
D. MICC MISSION, VISION, GOALS, AND SCOPE OF SERVICES 
As part of the Army’s generating force, the MICC’s mission is to plan, integrate, 
award, and administer contracts throughout the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) 
Cycle supporting the Army Commands (ACOMs); Direct Reporting Units (DRUs); U.S. 
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Army, North (USARNORTH); and other organizations to provide the best value for the 
mission, soldiers, and their families (MICC, 2011).  The MICC’s vision is to function “as an 
integral and indispensable partner in accomplishing the Army’s mission through contracted 
materiel and services solutions (MICC, 2011, para. 2).  The establishment of the MICC has 
provided a framework for contracting personnel to improve coordination and responsiveness, 
which has resulted in better contract support (McFall & La, 2011).  The four goals that 
leadership established for the MICC are the following:  
 To ensure that contracts meet customer requirements, reflect sound business 
judgment, and comply with laws and regulations. 
 To select contractors that provide the best value to the government. 
 To ensure that contractors deliver quality goods and services that meet the 
commander’s requirements on time and at a reasonable cost. 
 To ensure that contractors are paid fair and reasonable compensation for their 
services. (MICC, 2011) 
As we stated in Chapter II, in this study we focus on four PSCs (R, D, S, and J) 
because they represent the largest part of the service contracts in terms of dollar value and are 
common services used throughout all Army installations.  PSCs R and D represent complex-
type services and PSCs J and S represent simple-type services, based on contract 
requirements (McFall & La, 2011).  In order to expand the data collected in McFall and La’s 
2011 report, we chose two MICC centers and four DOCs as locations to visit for this study.  
Combined with the data collected from the two MICC centers that McFall and La (2011) 
analyzed, we analyze a total of four MICC centers and four DOCs in this study.    
E. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish a basis for the empirical analysis of 
Army service contract management practices at the MICC.  First, we presented issues and 
recommendations that the Gansler Commission identified. These recommendations laid the 
foundation for the establishment of the ACC and the MICC. We then provided detailed 
information about the mission, vision, and organization of the ACC and the MICC.  Next, we 
discussed the different service contracts that the MICC offices administer and award.  Last, 
we discussed the service contracts by PSC and highlighted the four PSCs that we evaluated 
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for the purposes of this research.  In the next chapter, we present the methodology behind 
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we explain how we collected and evaluated data to meet our research 
objectives and answer the research questions proposed in Chapter I.   Specifically, we reveal 
how we selected participants or MICCs offices for evaluation, the questions used on the data 
collection form, and the information we obtained from the collected data.  Furthermore, we 
provide a brief description of the qualitative and quantitative methods we used in analyzing 
the data collected from the six Army MICC installations we visited.  
B. METHODS USED IN SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
As we mentioned in Chapter III, the MICC is configured with six regional contracting 
centers and 36 Directorates of Contracting (DOCs; ACC, 2011a).  The purpose for this 
research is to perform an evaluation of Army service contract management, including 
procurement and administrative methods, to help understand the drivers of service 
contracting practices, and to improve the acquisition process. We used a data collection form 
(see Appendix A), developed during a pilot study in McFall and La’s 2011 MBA report, to 
collect data for this research. The form was geared towards collecting objective-based data. 
We chose the six locations used in this research because they had a wide variety of service 
contracts that we could analyze. We analyzed the data quantitatively and qualitatively to 
draw conclusions about management practices used at the MICC installations we visited, 
similar to McFall and La’s 2011 MBA report.  In addition, as we discussed in Chapter III, we 
focused our data collection on only four types of services. The service types examined were 
PSC R (Professional, Administrative, and Management Support Services), PSC J 
(Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment), PSC S (Utilities and Housekeeping 
Services), and PSC D (Automatic Data Processing and Telecommunications Services). In 
their pilot project, McFall and La evaluated 40 contracts, and in this study we collected data 
on 114 contracts. Combining the two data sets, our total sample size consisted of 154 
contracts. We did not use a specific method for selecting contracts for analysis.  The selected 
MICC offices provided a random sampling of contracts for these specific service codes.  
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C. DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS 
The data collection form used in our research is included in Appendix A.  McFall and 
La (2011) developed the form to answer the following questions: 
 Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
 Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices being 
used?   
 Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used?  
Part I of the data collection form concentrates on important contract characteristics, 
such as type of service contract, use of competition, award type and basis, key acquisition 
dates, use of an independent government estimate (IGE), and contract value. Additionally, 
we gathered data on management practices, such as the use of a team approach, the number 
people assigned to the contract, the personnel generating requirements, the number of 
modifications, the contract surveillance used, and contract closeout (McFall & La, 2011).  
McFall and La developed Part II of the form to capture the capacity of MICC offices 
in relation to management practices. Part II of the data collection form (see Appendix B) 
focuses on administrative management issues. Answers to questions in Part II provide the 
number and dollar value of service contracts awarded in FY 2011, the annual budget for 
service contracts staff, the number of billets authorized and filled at each MICC office, and 
the current training level and certification of the acquisition workforce at each MICC office.  
Other questions concentrate on the level of experience of the workforce and the average 
workload at each MICC office.  
D. ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
We used descriptive and inferential statistics to analyze the data collected from six 
MICC offices, similar to McFall and La’s 2011 MBA report, in order to maintain data 
integrity.  Our goal was to expand their research and obtain a larger sample of contracts from 
different MICC offices.  In Chapter V, we reveal nominal (qualitative) and interval 
(quantitative) data in graphical and tabular formats.  We draw conclusions on relationships 
depicted in these graphs to answer the three research questions we identified in Chapter I.  In 
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order to support these relationships, we used information from the literature review to 
identify the drivers of acquisition management practices, as well as to analyze the similarities 
and differences among the six installations.   
In this study, factor 1 refers to service type and factor 2 refers to one of the various 
contract characteristics or management practices we observed during our visits to the MICC 
offices. To test the relationship between these factors in service contracts, we applied a chi-
squared test of a contingency table using Equation 1. We started with a null hypothesis that 
factor 1 does not have a relationship with factor 2. 
                        (1) 
In Equation 1, k is the number of cells in the cross-classification table, f is the observed 
values, and e represents the expected values.  The chi-squared value (χ2) corresponds to a p 
value in a chi-squared distribution table.  A lower p value disproves that there is no 
relationship between the variables at that level of confidence.  We evaluated all data in 
Chapter V using a 95% confidence interval, or a 0.05 significance level. Among statisticians, 
a chi-square of 0.05 is typically considered an acceptable threshold of statistical significance 
(Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998). When the p value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and usually considered as “statistically significant” (Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998). 
On the contrary, when the p value is greater than 0.05, the probability that the recorded 
observation occurred by chance increases, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
(Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998).  In this study, when the p value is less than 0.05, we are 
confident in rejecting the possibility that no association exists between the independent and 
dependent variables (Rosenzweig & Thelen, 1998). 
E. SUMMARY 
In Chapters I through IV, we provided a foundation for this research.  We covered the 
magnitude of this research (Chapters I and II), from where we collected the data (Chapter 
III), and how we collected and analyzed the data (Chapter IV).  In the next two chapters, we 
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present our findings and the applications from the data we collected.  In Chapter V, we 
present the results and analysis of the data we collected and discuss the data and what we 
believe affects its behavior.  In Chapter VI, we summarize the entire research project, draw 
conclusions about the findings, and recommend areas for future studies.  
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter V, we capture the analysis of the data we collected in order to answer the 
three questions we proposed for this research in Chapter I.  We answer these questions 
individually using qualitative and quantitative methods.  The three research questions are 
restated below:   
 Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
 Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices being 
used?   
 Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used? 
We used the statistical technique of chi-squared hypothesis testing in our analysis to 
determine whether or not we can disprove that there is not a relationship among service 
types, specific contract characteristics, and specific management practices in service 
contracting. The chi-squared test does not directly determine whether or not service type 
affects a specific contract characteristic or the strength of the relationship; however, it can 
suggest, with a certain degree of confidence, if a relationship exists between the service type 
and a specific contract characteristic.  We conduct chi-squared tests for this analysis using a 
95% confidence interval. The null hypothesis states that there is no relationship between 
factor 1 and factor 2.  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis for all chi-squared tests in this 
report whenever the p value is less than 0.05. As a result, in those cases, we interpret the data 
with a 95% level of confidence that the test disproves that there is not a relationship between 
the two factors, as described in Table 2.  The results for the chi-squared calculations 
presented in this chapter are found in Appendix B. 
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Table 2.   Chi-Square Hypothesis Testing 
p value Reject Null Hypothesis  Meaning 
Less than 0.05  Yes  Disproves that there is no relationship
Greater than 0.05 No  There is no relationship 
 
The data represents a small portion of the contract files administered and executed at 
Army MICC centers and DOCs, a research limitation we discussed in Chapter I.  As we 
stated in Chapter IV, the sample size we used for this research included 154 contracts.  
McFall and La (2011), in their pilot project, evaluated 40 contracts, and in this study we 
collected data on 114 additional contracts. Although the sample size is small compared to the 
entire pool of contracts at the installations, we can analyze the information we collected to 
recommend improvements and to guide future research.  
B. SERVICE TYPE AND CONTRACT CHARACTERISTICS 
The focus of our first research question was to determine whether a relationship exists 
between contract characteristics and service type, as illustrated in Figure 14.  We collected 
and evaluated information concerning six specific contract characteristics.  The six contract 
characteristics we examined were (1) level of competition used, (2) contract type, (3) 
award/incentive fee, (4) contract cost in dollar value, (5) number of modifications, and (6) 
award basis.   
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Figure 14.   Assessment of Relationship Between Service Type and  
Contract Characteristics 
In this section, we define the categories for award basis or contractor selection 
process as full and open competition (lowest price technically acceptable [LPTA] and best-
value tradeoff) and as sole source (e.g., AbilityOne, direct-award-to-small-business set-
asides, only one provider, and unusual and compelling urgency). According to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), full and open competition, “when used with respect to a 
contract action, means that all responsible sources are permitted to compete” for contract 
award (FAR, 2011, subpart 2.101). The LPTA selection process is appropriate when best-
value is expected to result from the selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the 
lowest evaluated price (FAR, 2011, subpart 15.101-2). A best-value tradeoff process is 
appropriate when it is in the best interest of the government to consider award to other than 
the lowest priced offeror or other than the highest technically rated offeror (FAR, 2011, 
subpart 15.101-1). Additionally, a sole-source acquisition means a contract for the purchase 
of supplies or services that an agency enters into or proposes to enter into after soliciting and 
negotiating with only one source (FAR, 2011, subpart 2.101). The types of sole-source 
acquisitions that we evaluate in this research are AbilityOne, direct-award-to-small-business 
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set-asides, only one provider, and unusual and compelling urgency. AbilityOne, as stated in 
the FAR (2011, subpart 8.7), is a mandatory source of services that requires ordering offices 
to purchase services from nonprofit agencies participating in AbilityOne, unless the agency 
cannot perform the service. 
When an acquisition exceeds the competitive threshold, the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) is allowed to use direct-awards-to-small-business-set-asides if there is 
not a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms (a specific 
type of set-aside) will submit offers at a fair market price; or the SBA can accept a new 
requirement on behalf of a concern owned by an Indian tribe or Alaska Native Corporation 
(FAR, 2011, subpart 19.805-1).  Only one provider means that the supplies or services the 
agency requires are available from only one responsible source, and no other type of supplies 
or services will satisfy agency requirements (FAR, 2011, subpart 6.302-1). According to the 
FAR, “services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the government would be 
seriously injured unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it 
solicits bids or proposals, full and open competition need not be provided for” (FAR, 2011, 
subpart 6.302-2).  
In the following evaluation of service types, we use the terms we defined previously. 
Service types J and S, which can be categorized as simple non-recurring services, used an 
LPTA award basis more often.  Service types R & D, which are typically categorized as more 
complex, used best value tradeoff procedures as an award basis more frequently.   
Service type S displayed the use of AbilityOne contractors as an award basis more 
frequently than any other service type.  Additionally, we observed that service type S had a 
higher dollar value and required a high number of modifications, most likely due to the fact 
that service type S is a recurring service.  However, the data disproved that there was not a 
relationship overall between service type and award basis.   
Analysis results also revealed areas where all four service types shared the same 
contract characteristics.  All of the contracts were firm-fixed-price (FFP) with only one 
utilizing incentive or award fee.  This observation is not unusual given these types of services 
are highly commercialized and well-defined.  Table 3 summarizes the chi-squared test results 
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between service type (factor 1) and contract characteristics (factor 2).  From the table, we can 
ascertain whether the data suggests a relationship between factor 1 and factor 2.  
Table 3.   Chi-Square Hypothesis Testing Results Between Service Type  
and Contract Characteristics 























0.0268 < 0.05 Yes
 
We evaluate each contract characteristic compared to service type in further detail in 
Subsections 1–5. 
1. Level of Competition Used 
Level of competition used refers to whether or not the contracts were solicited by the 
MICC offices using full and open competition or sole-source methods.  Figure 15 depicts the 
use of competition by service type for the data we observed in this study. As Table 3 shows, 
the p value is greater than 0.05; therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  Based on this 
information and the information in Figure 15, we can determine that there is no relationship 
between service types and whether or not the requirement was solicited using full and open 
competition or sole-source methods. Figure 15 shows that 56% of the requirements for all 
four service types were solicited using full and open competition and 44% were sole sourced.  
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Based on the data presented, we recommend that the MICC offices further analyze its 
methods to increase competition and steer away from the use of sole-source methods, unless 
regulation or law dictates otherwise. Competition needs to be increased in an effort to answer 
USD(AT&L) Carter’s call for the DoD to focus on promoting real competition and to “DO 

































Figure 15.   Analysis of Level of Competition Used by Service Types 
To promote a better understanding of the large percentage of sole-sourced contracts, 
as displayed in Figure 16, we discuss the various justifications used for those requirements.  
Out of the 154 contracts in the sample that we evaluated, 44% of the contracts were not used 
in competition.  Figure 16 shows that out of the 68 sole-sourced contracts, 38% of the 
justifications were classified as claiming that there was only one responsible provider that 
could satisfy agency requirements.  In addition, 16% of justifications were of an unusual and 
compelling urgency, which is a high percentage considering the contracts being awarded 
were not for a contingency.  Justifications should be scrutinized further to increase 
competition in service contracts at all Army MICCs.   
However, 46% of the sole-source justifications were for direct award to small 
business set-asides, utilities, and AbilityOne agencies. Set-aside programs, such as small 
businesses, accounted for 28% of the sole-source justifications.  Another 9% was composed 
of AbilityOne contractors, such as National Industries for the Blind (NIB) and National 
Industries for the Severely Handicapped (NISH).  Utilities, usually regulated by states or 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 41 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
counties, accounted for 9% of the justifications.  The use of both AbilityOne contractors and 
specific utility companies is a result of mandatory laws and regulations limiting the MICC 
offices from providing for full and open competition in these instances.  Nevertheless, there 
is still evidence that contracts are not being competed to the fullest extent possible.  As 
Figure 15 shows, all four types of services were solicited for competition about 56% of the 
time, which does not conform to the FAR (2011) part 6 (Competition Requirements) and 













Figure 16.   Justification for Sole-Source Solicitation 
2. Contract Type and Incentive or Award Fees 
Contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts and cost-
reimbursement contracts. According to the FAR part 16, 
the specific contract types range from firm-fixed-price (FFP), in which the 
contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit 
(or loss), to cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has minimal 
responsibility for the performance costs and the negotiated fee (profit) is 
fixed. (FAR, 2011, subpart 16.101) 
The sample of contracts we reviewed consisted of all FFP contracts, consequently rendering 
the chi-squared test as invalid, as shown in Table 3.  The types of services that we evaluated 
were all highly commercialized and well-defined. Thus, the FAR (2011) subpart 16.201 
states that the contracting officer shall use FFP or fixed-price economic price adjustment 
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contracts when acquiring commercial items. As well, FFP contracts should be used when the 
risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty; however, 
in situations where the risk for the contractor is high and a reasonable basis for firm pricing 
does not exist, other contract types should be considered (FAR, 2011, subpart 16.103). As 
expected, FFP is the preferred method for requirements that are well-defined and can be 
easily measured, such as the four types of services we evaluated in this study, because FFP 
contracts decrease the risk for the government and increases the risk for contractors.  Because 
our data showed all FFP contracts, the results indicate that there is no relationship between 
the type of service and contract type presented in this data.  
Incentive or award fee refers to whether or not an incentive or award fee was used in 
the contract to motivate contractors.  All the contracts we evaluated did not include incentive 
or award fees except for one; as a result, the chi-squared test was invalid.  The one contract 
that did include an award term was for a 10-year dining facilities contract, a service type S 
contract.  The fact that there was only one contract that utilized an award term fee out of 154 
contracts we reviewed confirms the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the 
types of services used and the use of incentive or award fees in the acquisition process.  
Incentive or award fees require additional resources and might discourage contracting offices 
from using them.  They also require a higher level of contracting expertise, and many offices 
may not have enough qualified personnel to administer them. Additionally, there is little risk 
and uncertainty in these four types of commercial services.  They do not require extra 
consideration to incentivize suppliers compared to a research-and-development type service, 
where a cost-reimbursable contract with an award or incentive fee to take on high risk and 
uncertain types of work may be considered. Contractors have no incentive to innovate 
without incentive or award fees. They should be used only when there are possibilities for the 
contractor to be innovative in satisfying contract requirements.  
We recommend that future procurements that involve recurring or non-severable 
services utilize the exercising of an option as an incentive to motivate contractors. This will 
steer organizations away from exercising options at end of year just to eliminate the 
administrative burden of awarding another contract. It may be beneficial to conduct future 
studies to analyze cost-reimbursable contracts in these four service types and determine 
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whether there are any reasons for or benefits to using cost contracts or incentives or award 
fees for these types of services.   
3. Contract Value 
The average base value of contract by service type, as illustrated in Figure 17, shows 
that the average base value of service type S contracts (Utilities and Housekeeping Services) 
are significantly more than the other three types of services.  Typically, services for utilities 
and housekeeping are annual services versus the non-recurring services that may exist for 
one month in the other three types of services we evaluated.  Furthermore, the contract for 
utilities and housekeeping typically supports the needs of the whole military installation, 
which results in higher costs.  A good portion of service type S contracts are not competed 
because of the required use of AbilityOne contractors or specific utility providers, which 
potentially drive up costs. The chi-squared test resulted in a p value less than 0.05; therefore, 
we rejected the null hypothesis, as illustrated in Table 3, and disproved that there is no 


























Figure 17.   Average Annual Base Value of Contracts by Service Type 
4. Number of Modifications 
In the sample of contracts we evaluated, there were a total of 570 modifications.  The 
types of modifications we observed included supplemental agreements, novation agreements, 
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termination of contracts, administrative changes, funding changes, and the exercising of 
options. Service type R and S contracts had a total of 423 modifications, which is 
significantly higher than the total number of modifications for service types D and J, as 
illustrated in Figure 18.  We expected this high number, considering contracts for service 
types R and S are usually services recurring for mutiple years compared to service types D 
and J that are typically severable or non-recurring.  However, Figure 18 shows that the 
percentage of modifications that were made to exercise an option were greater for service 
types D and J. This result was not expected considering service types D and J are typically 
severable services.  Additionally, Figure 18 reveals that the percentage of administrative 
changes were significantly high for service types D and J.  The percentage of funding 
modifications was higher for service type S, which is most likely due to the type of contract 
used.  Based on the number of modifications, we can assume that service type S contracts 
have many requirements or use indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts in 































Figure 18.   Percentage of Modifications for Contracts by Service Type 
The p value, shown in Table 3, is less than 0.05; therefore, we reject the null 
hypothesis.  Accordingly, the data suggests that there is a relationship between service type 
and the number of and reasons for modifications. However, there is a limitation in the data 
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analysis for this particular chi-squared test because there were fewer than five observations in 
a few cells of the contingency table.  An accepted validation for a chi-squared statistic 
derived from a contingency table is that the “expected cell frequencies should satisfy the rule 
of five” (Keller, 2009 p. 591).  While this particular calculation did not satisfy this rule, we 
determinined that this particular category warranted further analysis. As a result, there could 
be numerous reasons for this observation; however, there is no way to show causation with 
the data collected.  
We recommend that MICC offices further evaluate this statistic to determine whether 
there is any potential for reducing the number of modifcations for service type R and S 
contracts to ease unecessary burdens on contracting personnel. The restructuring and 
management practices of the MICC centers normally drive administrative changes, and if not 
managed correctly these changes increase the workload for contracting personnel, which are 
valuable resources.  In order to avoid numerous modifications that could drive up costs, 
requirements should be defined as early and as clearly as possible during the acquisiton 
planning phase.  Although the data suggests a relationship between service type and the 
number of modifications, other factors not related to service type might share a relationship 
with the number of contract modifications. 
5. Award Basis or Contractor Selection Process 
Award basis refers to the strategy used to select which contractor receives the 
contract award.  The categories for the award basis or contractor selection process include 
full and open competition (LPTA and best value tradeoff) and sole source (e.g., AbilityOne, 
direct award to small business set-asides, only one provider, and unusual and compelling 
urgency). The chi-squared test revealed a p value less than 0.05; therefore, we reject the null 
hypothesis suggesting that there is a relationship between service type and award basis.  
Figure 19 summarizes the percentage of award basis type used for the observed service type 
contracts.  An LPTA contract was used more frequently for all service types; however, the 
data in Figure 19 shows that an LPTA was used at least 50% of the time for service types D 
and J.  Additionally, Figure 19 illustrates that direct awards to small business set-asides exist 
regardless of the service type, and that there is a relationship between AbilityOne programs 
and service type S. The figure also shows that a best value tradeoff determination that 
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includes evaluation of price and non-price factors for award was used more for service types 





































Figure 19.   Composition of Award Basis by Service Type 
All the contracts we observed that were solicited through full and open competition 
were awarded based off of an LPTA or best value tradeoff. Nevertheless, an LPTA was the 
preferred method over best value tradeoff because the majority of the requirements were 
well-defined, and the best value was expected to result from the selection of the technically 
acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price.  
Due to the large amount of sole-source procurements we observed in this sample, we 
took a deeper look to see if contract files included documentation of price fair and 
reasonableness as required by both law and the FAR.  Types of sole-source acquisition 
justifications that we observed in this research were AbilityOne, direct award to small 
business set-asides, only one provider, and unusual and compelling urgency. In order to 
determine whether fair and reasonable pricing was considered for all sole-source 
requirements, we reviewed the contract file to see whether an independent government 
estimate (IGE) or a pricing analysis was documented in the file.  Figure 20 reveals that 50% 
of the requirements that were considered sole source had no determination of price fair and 
reasonableness located in the contract file.  The MICC offices should further investigate this 
practice, because determining fair and reasonable pricing is required regardless of the sole-
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 47 -=
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
source justification.  This statistic shows that this practice may be resulting in increased costs 
for these types of services.  
 
 
Figure 20.   Evidence of Price Fair and Reasonableness of  
All Sole-Source Contracts 
As we discussed previously in Section B, Subsection 1, sole-source justifications 
should be reduced significantly to align installation level goals, such as promoting real 
competition, with that of the USD(AT&L).  Even though circumstances permit other than 
full and open competition (i.e., sole source), the MICC offices should compete all 
requirements to the maximum extent practicable, which may result in cost savings. 
C. SERVICE TYPE AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
For our second research question, we focus on whether a relationship exists between 
service type and management practices, as illustrated in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21.   Assessment of Relationship Between Service Type  
and Management Practices 
The majority of management practices we evaluated show no evidence of a 
relationship between the two factors. Specifically, the data disproves that there is no 
relationship between service type and the following management practices:  the use of IGEs, 
the use of IGEs provided for contracts based on contract value, the number of personnel 
assigned to a contract, the contracting lead for the requirement, and the use of a quality 
assurance surveillance plan (QASP).  A summary of the chi-squared test results between 
service types and management practices are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Chi-Square Hypothesis Testing Results Between  
Service Type and Management Practices 
Factor 1 Factor 2 P‐value Significance Reject Null Hypothesis
Service Type Use of IGEs by Service Type 0.0068 < 0.05  Yes 
IGE Use of IGEs for Contracts over $100K 0.0002 < 0.05  Yes 
Service Type # of personnel assigned to contract  0.0449 < 0.05  Yes 
Service Type # of personnel generating/changing requirements 0.0822 > 0.05  No 
Service Type # of Personnel Assigned to Contract Management Oversight 0.1695 > 0.05  No 
Service Type Team Approach  0.3142 > 0.05  No 
Service Type Acquisition Lead 0.0076 < 0.05  Yes 
Service Type Contract Award Time 0.1127 > 0.05  No 
Service Type Documentation (Acquisition Plan)  0.5665 > 0.05  No 
Service Type Documentation (PWS/SOW) 0.6909 > 0.05  No 
Service Type Documentation (Pricing Analysis) 0.5391 > 0.05  No 
Service Type Documentation (PNM) 0.0871 > 0.05 No
Service Type Documentation (QASP Plan) 0.0115 < 0.05  Yes 
Service Type Documentation (Closeout Letter)  0.4676 > 0.05  No 
 
1. Use of Independent Government Estimates by Service Type and Use of 
Independent Government Estimates for Contracts Over $100,000 
The data indicate that the use of IGEs was low for all four types of services, as 
illustrated in Figure 22. The p value presented in Table 4 is less than 0.05; therefore, we 
rejected the null hypothesis and disproved that there is no relationship between service type 
and whether or not an IGE was provided.  As illustrated in Figure 22, about 50% of contracts 
for all service types did not have an IGE, which is troubling, considering that 68 out of 154 
contracts were sole-sourced, as discussed previously in Section B, Subsection 1. 
Through further analysis of this data, we show that there is a relationship between the 
use of IGEs and the dollar value of the contracts, as shown in Figure 23.  When testing the 
relationship between an IGE that was provided and the contract value, we determined that the 
p value was less than 0.05; therefore, we rejected the null hypothesis.  This p value suggests a 
relationship between the use of IGEs and contract value.  Furthermore, based on our analysis 
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in Section B, Subsection 3, we suggest that there is a relationship between contract dollar 
value and service type; therefore, the data also implies that there is an indirect relationship 
between service type and the use of IGEs. Per Army Regulation (AR) 70-13, an IGE is 
required for all contracts that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT; Department 
of the Army, 2010, p. 7).  At the time of McFall and La’s (2011) study, the simplified 
acquisition threshold was $100,000 but has since been increased to $150,000.  In order to 
maintain data integrity, we used the $100,000 threshold.  Figure 23 illustrates that 62% of the 
contracts over $100,000 did have an IGE in the contract file.  However, this percentage is 
low considering the requirement to provide an IGE per AR 70-13.  We recommend MICC 





































































Figure 23.   IGEs Provided for Contracts Over or Under $100,000 
2. The Number of Personnel Assigned to a Contract and the Number of 
Personnel Generating or Changing Requirements 
We evaluated contract files to determine how many personnel were assigned to 
contracts, their respective positions, and which personnel generated requirements or changes 
to those requirements.  Personnel included in our review were contracting officers, 
contracting specialists, customers, contracting officer representatives (COR), and quality 
assurance evaluators (QAE).  During our research, we observed that program managers were 
non-existent at all the MICC offices.  A 2011 GAO report emphasized the need for the 
involvement of a program manager to initiate services acquisitions (GAO, 2011).  The lack 
of program managers highlights potential problems, especially for large complicated services 
acquisitions, that may develop into major issues in the future as the need for services in the 
DoD continues to grow.  It is also important to note that we found it difficult to discover 
exactly which personnel assigned to a contract evaluated the performance of the contractor 
because each installation managed the filing and storing of contract documentation in 
different ways.  For example, one office stored files electronically, while other offices that 
maintained hard-copy documentation did not organize and file documents in the same 
manner.  Based on our data, we suggest that the contents of many contract files did not meet 
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guidelines found in the FAR (2011) part 4 (Administrative Matters), hindering our ability to 
objectively evaluate each file. 
Based on the results of the chi-squared test for this section, we reject the null 
hypothesis, which indicates that there is a relationship between service type and the number 
of personnel assigned to a contract.  The average number of personnel assigned to contracts 
was high for service types R and S, which may have contributed to the fact that these services 
typically have longer durations and usually involve a much larger scope, such as for an entire 
installation.  However, the number of personnel assigned to a contract appeared to be driven 
more by the standard practices of the MICC centers we observed.  Typically, most centers 
followed a standard practice of assigning a contracting officer and contracting specialist to a 
requirement for pre-award activities, and a contracting officer, contracting specialist, and 
COR or customer for the post-award activities.  Therefore, we argue that service type does 
not have a relationship with the number of personnel assigned as much as the standard 
practices of a particular contracting office. 
Additionally, we performed a chi-squared test to determine whether a relationship 
existed between service types and the number of personnel generating or changing 
requirements.  The resulting p value was greater than 0.05; therefore, we could not reject the 
null hypothesis, suggesting there is no relationship between the two factors. However, 
McFall and La (2011) found that there is a relationship between service types and the number 
of modifications, as we discussed in Section B of this chapter.  McFall and La (2011) 
suggested that the customer or the contracting office may be generating and changing a 
requirement, which drives whoever develops initial or new requirements.  Therefore, 
agreeing with McFall and La, we suggest an indirect relationship between service type and 
the number of personnel generating or changing requirements because service type may drive 
the number of modifications. 
3. The Number of Personnel Assigned to Contract Management Oversight 
Contract management oversight is defined as the duties and responsibilities assigned 
to personnel for post-award functions in an effort to monitor contactor performance and 
provide oversight of the contractor.  The chi-squared test in Table 4 indicates that there is no 
relationship between the number of personnel assigned to contract management oversight 
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and service type.  This observation differs from McFall and La’s (2011) calculations and 
could be the result of a larger sample.  Their sample included only 40 contracts, and in our 
study we combined their 40 contracts with the 114 that we evaluated.  This result is not 
surprising because we expect characteristics such as dollar value, complexity, and scope of 
the contract to determine the number of personnel assigned to contract management 
oversight.   
4. Team Approach 
We reviewed contract files to analyze whether a team approach was used in services 
acquisitions.  We considered factors, such as memorandums for record, signature blocks on 
documents, and documented email correspondence, to determine whether multiple parties 
were involved during pre-award and post-award activities and these parties had an 
understanding of roles and responsibilities.  The team approach concept includes personnel 
from contracting, finance, legal, industry and the requiring activity.  As a best practice, 
ideally, a team approach should be used, regardless of service type (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
Based on the calculation shown in Table 4, which used the chi-squared test, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis; therefore, we suggest that there is no relationship between service type 
and whether a team approach was used.  The data we observed shows that only 93 out of the 
154 contracts we evaluated had evidence of a team approach in the contract files, even 
though the use of a team approach is required per AR 70-13 (Department of the Army, 2010, 
p. 1). Thus, there is cause for concern, considering only 60% of the contract files were 
compliant.  
5. Acquisition Lead 
As previously discussed in section C2, a program manager was not identified in any 
of the reviewed contracts.  At the operational level, the contracting officer is typically 
assigned or assumed to act as the acquisition lead because there is no one else available.  Out 
of the 154 contracts we evaluated, we clearly identified the contracting officer as the 
acquisition lead for 146 of the contracts, with the contracting specialist as the acquisition lead 
for the remaining eight.  We rejected the null hypothesis for this comparison, which 
demonstrated a relationship between service type and the individual designated as the 
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acquisition lead.  Because there are very few, if any, program managers at the operational 
level, we expected this finding.  However, if reliance on services continues to grow and the 
DoD continues to seek ways to improve efficiency for services, including program managers 
at the installation level may be an area of further research to determine the impact the 
position would have on the acquisition process.  
6. Contract Award Time 
The time it takes for a contracting office to award a contract after receipt of the 
purchase request is called the standard procurement administrative lead-time (PALT). The 
PALT for this study is defined as awarding contracts within 60 days.  Chi-squared testing 
(see Table 4) revealed no relationship between contract type and the PALT for requirements 
evaluated.  Figure 24 shows that service type D met PALT 68% of the time, service type S 
met PALT 40% of the time, and service types J and R met PALT roughly 50% of the time.  
The lack of evidence to support a relationship between service type and PALT may be a 
result of manning issues, customer relationships, or receiving timely inputs from customers.  
Other factors may exist that potentially affect the award time for contracts that are not related 
to service type.  For example, award times may be driven by such factors as the workforce 
workload and availability of funds, which are not related to service type. 
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Figure 24.   Contracts Meeting PALT by Service Type 
7. Documentation 
During the data collection process, we determined whether the following contract 
documents were filed:  acquisition plan, performance work statement (PWS) or statement of 
work (SOW), pricing analysis, price negotiation memorandum (PNM), quality assurance 
surveillance plan (QASP), and contract closeout letter.  We performed a chi-squared test for 
each document type, and the only document rejecting the null hypothesis and appearing to 
have a relationship with service type was the QASP.  However, there was no indication of a 
relationship between the other documentation and service types. Figure 25 reveals that the 
majority of contract files we reviewed lacked the specific documentation noted above.  For 
instance, out of 154 contracts, 73% included a PWS or SOW, and only 40% had an 
acquisition plan. Additionally, only 11% of the contracts that were closed out included a 
closeout letter.  Due to time constraints and workload, the filing of a closeout letter was not a 
priority across the board.  We suppose from these findings that important contract 
documentation, which are standard requirements for contract files and are used to protect the 
government’s interests, especially a service contract, was either missing or not completed.
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Other factors may impact contract file documentation as well.  For example, even 
though required, the QASPs may not be included in the contracting office’s files, but they 
may be maintained with the COR’s or QAE’s files.  Therefore, MICC offices must 
emphasize pre-award and post-award documentation to satisfy all requirements, not just the 
procurement of the service in order to protect the government’s interests.  This is an area of 
concern, and management should conduct further analysis to determine whether 




































Figure 25.   Percentage of Contract File Documentation Found in Contract Files 
D. CAPACITY AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
In our third and final research question, we focused on whether the capacity for 
carrying out acquisition-related work affects the management practices the MICC offices 
employ.  To have effective capacity, an organization needs an appropriate amount of billets 
that are filled with personnel that are properly trained.  It is beneficial for organizations to 
ensure that personnel filling billets are well-trained, rather than simply to ensure that all 
billets are filled.  Effective capacity is not realized if billets are filled with personnel that are 
not properly trained.  Without effective capacity, an organization is not assured of getting the 
best value in its contracts and achieve adequate protection of government’s interests. 
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In order to determine whether a relationship exists between capacity and management 
practices, we used Part II of the data collection form developed by McFall and La (2011), 
found in Appendix A, to collect administrative data from each office.  The data we present in 
this section includes the data collected by McFall and La and data from five of the six offices 
visited for this study, for a total sample size of seven offices.  One office, MICC Office B, 
was unable to provide the data requested for this section.  Because of the small sample size, 
we used descriptive statistics to evaluate the relationship between capacity and management 
practices.  The capacity categories examined were as follows:  
 dollar value by service type; 
 number of billets for contracting officers, contracting specialists, program 
managers, and COR/QAE-authorized and number filled-billets; 
 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification 
levels for acquisition workforce; 
 number of years of experience of the acquisition workforce; and 
 average number of contracts the acquisition workforce managed.  
A total of $1.795 billion was obligated in FY 2010 by these seven offices for the four 
service contract types observed in this study, a significant dollar amount for seven out of 36 
MICC offices and DOCs across the country.  Service type R (Professional, Administrative, 
and Management Support Services) and service type S (Utilities and Housekeeping Services) 
accounted for 87.4% of the total contracts.  As we discussed in Chapter II, the four PSCs 
selected for this study accounted for over 60% of the service contracts utilized across Army 
installations (McFall & La, 2011).  The high percentage for service types R and S indicates a 
significant reliance on these two particular service types.  This high percentage also implies 
that the majority of resources the acquisition workforce spent revolved around R and S type 
service contracts, which we view as vital components to daily operations across Army 
installations.  For the four service types observed in this study, the total dollar value, the total 
number of contracts awarded, and the average service contract dollar value for each MICC 
office are shown in Table 5.  
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Total Dollar Value of 
Service Contracts 
Awarded (R, D, S, & J)
$17,435,363 $38,361,394 $931,231,325 $316,000,000 $293,000,000 $301,000,000
Total Number of 
Service Contracts 
Awarded (R, D, S, & J)
76 766 542 226 350 804
Average Dollar Value 




Based on our data, with the amount of dollars obligated by these offices, the majority 
of offices do not appear to have the necessary number of contracting officers and contracting 
specialists authorized to handle this sizable workload.  The billets for warranted contracting 
officers and contracting specialists averaged an 89% fill rate, with a range of 57% to 100%.  
For contracting specialists, the average fill rate was 81%, with a range of 47% to 117%.  
While some MICC offices have the authorized number of personnel filling these acquisition 
roles, the majority does not.  Based on the number of filled billets and the number of 
contracts obligated, acquisition personnel are individually managing 7.8 service contracts, on 
average.  If authorized billets were maintained at a 100% fill rate, individual acquisition 
personnel would manage approximately 6.5 service contracts, on average.  In this study, we 
focused on four specific service types and did not account for all procurement requirements 
the MICC offices handled.  Therefore, this fill rate indicates that the MICCs are managing 
substantial workloads with limited personnel. 
In addition, we looked at the number of acquisition personnel filling billets that 
required DAWIA Level I, II, or III certification, and whether or not certification was 
obtained.  Out of the seven offices surveyed, only 31% of acquisition personnel holding a 
billet requiring DAWIA Level I certification were certified at that level.  Acquisition 
personnel holding a billet requiring DAWIA Level II and Level III certification maintained a 
70% and 72% certification rate, respectively.  The data suggests that the acquisition 
personnel in these MICC offices do not have the proper education, training, or experience for 
the positions they hold.  Based on the workload observed for just four service types and the 
shortage of personnel, we infer that certification may not have been achieved due to the time 
constraints placed on the current workforce, the vital nature of mission execution, and 
funding constraints.  Also, the increase in the number of entrants to the DoD acquisition 
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workforce and the amount of training required to reach Level I certification may also explain 
the low percentage of certified personnel. 
Next, we observed the experience level of the contracting officers and contracting 
specialists in these MICC offices.  In our questionnaire, we asked for the level of experience 
of these personnel based on the number of months worked in an acquisition position.  The 
majority of offices have a higher percentage of personnel with at least three years of 
experience; however, the percentages are relatively low.  Table 6 displays the results of the 
data collected in regards to occupation of billets, certification levels, and experience levels of 
the acquisition workforce. 



















Warranted 100% 88% 83% 58% 100% 100% 100%
Non-warranted 0% 84% 106% 47% 117% 86% 86%
DAWIA I 23% 13% 23% 8% 0% 2% 0%
DAWIA II 162% 24% 16% 54% 66% 66% 68%
DAWIA III 100% 27% 33% 118% 0% 32% 32%
< 1 year 18% 14% 7% 0% 14% 10% 4%
1 - 2 years 18% 43% 12% 1% 23% 3% 2%
2 - 3 years 10% 16% 7% 9% 34% 19% 21%





Although approximately 60% of the personnel have more than 36 months of 
acquisition experience, over 40% do not.  This finding suggests that the workforce, from the 
Army installation perspective, does not have the level of experience necessary to properly 
manage the considerable workload imposed on these offices.  However, as displayed in Table 
6, there are instances in some MICC offices where billet and certification percentages are 
greater than 100%, indicating excess personnel in that specific area. 
Another area we looked at was the number of certified CORs and QAEs these offices 
managed; however, only two offices tracked this information.  According to ACC Pamphlet 
70-1 (2010), contracting officers are responsible for appointing properly trained CORs prior 
to awarding a contract.  Additionally, they are required to track and evaluate the performance 
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of CORs.  The key role of the COR and QAE is to observe, document, inspect, and 
communicate contractor performance to both the contracting officer and contractor.  The 
COR and the QAE are technical experts whose role is to ensure that the contractor meets all 
performance specifications.  For example, the COR for an installation dining facility contract 
is typically an experienced food service technician who confirms whether the contractor is in 
compliance with dining facility operation regulations and guidelines.  If a contract does not 
employ a COR with the proper technical background to manage the contract, then the 
government is not able to ensure that the contractor is in compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the contract, and thus the government’s interests are not protected.   The COR 
and QAE are vital to successful contract administration and serve as the eyes and ears of the 
contracting officer, and it is concerning that these pivotal personnel are not consistently 
tracked.   
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented the data we collected from research and the associated 
findings from the analysis to answer the three research questions we proposed in this study.  
First, we suggested that some contract characteristics share a relationship with the type of 
service being procured.  Second, we indicated that the type of service being acquired 
potentially influenced the management practices employed.  Third, using administrative data 
collected from these seven offices, albeit a small sample out of the total population, we 
suggested that the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affected management 
practices within an office. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH  
A. SUMMARY 
This research project was a continuation of McFall and La’s 2011 pilot study, and we 
designed our study to conduct further research in services acquisitions.  Our goal was to 
answer the three research questions related to acquisition in order to gain a better 
understanding of the drivers that affect management practices in services acquisitions.  
Ultimately, in this study we emphasize the need for determining new ways to improve 
performance in service contracting as services for the DoD continue to grow in scope, dollar 
amount and complexity.  In this study, we intended to increase the sample size by collecting 
data from eight MICC offices, and we hope our research will serve as a template for future 
research. 
In their pilot study, McFall and La (2011) laid the foundation for our research by 
establishing a model for assessing the acquisition of services of four prevalent PSCs, which 
were responsible for 60% of service contracts across Army installations.  In the first three 
chapters of our research, we focused on providing background information to establish the 
need for this research.  In our literature review, we discussed research published with regard 
to the DoD’s acquisition management process and reform initiatives in order to discuss 
current and relevant sources that contribute to the basis of this research.  We presented the 
historical and current organizational structure of Army contracting, as well as the impact of 
the Gansler Commission’s findings on the establishment of the ACC. 
Next, we presented our methodology for data collection and evaluation.  We 
examined contracts at six MICC offices and collected information identified on the data 
collection form (Appendix A).  We compiled our results with those of McFall and La (2011) 
and presented an analysis on whether a relationship existed between service type and certain 
contract characteristics and management practices.  Additionally, we collected administrative 
data to observe whether the capacity for conducting acquisition-related work affects 
management practices.    
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B. CONCLUSION 
1. Research Findings 
The three research questions are restated here: 
 Do the contract characteristics differ for different types of services?   
 Do the types of services being acquired affect the management practices being 
used?   
 Does the capacity for carrying out acquisition-related work affect the 
management practices being used? 
Our data suggests a relationship between service type and three contract characteristics and 
between service type and five management practices, as shown in Figure 26.  We discuss the 



















Figure 26.   Diagram of Findings From Data Analysis 
With regard to the first research question, out of the six characteristics we evaluated, 
the findings revealed a relationship between service type and three of the contract 
characteristics.  The average annual contract cost for service type S was significantly higher 
than the other three service types evaluated.  Additionally, the data revealed that the number 
of modifications applied to service types R and S were considerably larger than for service 
types D and J.  The data also suggested a relationship between service type and the award 
basis or contractor selection.  Service types D and J used LPTA selection approximately 50% 
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of the time, while service types R and S awarded contracts more frequently based on a best 
value tradeoff. 
Overwhelming evidence did not exist to support the hypothesis that the six contract 
characteristics shared a relationship with service type; however, all the contracts we 
examined did share similar characteristics.  We observed that every contract was awarded as 
FFP, only one contract utilized an incentive or award fee, and the use of competition in the 
solicitation process was not reliant on service type.  
With regard to the second research question, our findings suggested a relationship 
between service type and five of the 14 management practices evaluated, as shown in 
Figure 26.  The findings indicate a relationship between service types and the following 
management practices: the use of IGEs, the number of personnel assigned to a contract, the 
acquisition lead, whether or not a QASP was used, and whether or not an IGE was provided 
for contracts over the simplified acquisition threshold.   
However, some management practices did not show a relationship to service types.  
Those management practices included the use of a team approach, the number of personnel 
generating or changing requirements, the number of personnel conducting contract 
management oversight, contract award time, and contract documentation.  Accordingly, it 
appears that factors other than service type may share a stronger relationship with the 
management practices that we evaluated in this research.    
Standard practices for awarding service contracts were common at all the MICC 
offices; however, most offices did not incorporate a standard contract filing system.  For 
instance, most offices continue to maintain hard-copy files, while only one office maintained 
digital files.  Regardless of storage method, documentation was either incomplete or missing 
from files at all locations, making data collection difficult.   
Although each center employed different management practices, both centers 
followed standard practices for awarding service contracts. Even so, we must give 
consideration to the uniqueness of each center and its physical location, which influences the 
different management practices employed at each office. 
Lastly, with regard to the third research question, we focused on the effect of capacity 
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on management practices.  The administrative data suggests that a relationship exists 
between capacity and management practices.  For example, offices lacked the requisite 
number of authorized personnel to perform acquisition functions, and a majority of the 
personnel on hand lacked proper training certifications.  On average, these offices handled a 
significant amount of service contracts, and, not factoring in other procurement requirements, 
the MICC acquisition workforce is managing substantial workloads with minimal personnel. 
2. Recommendations 
Based on our findings, we offer recommendations for the awarding of service 
contracts.  With regard to contract characteristics, we have several recommendations based 
on the data presented. We suggest that MICC offices take a closer look at the justification for 
awarding sole-source service contracts.  Although there are instances in which contracting 
offices are required by law or regulation to use particular sources, it is imperative to ensure 
that fair and reasonable prices are obtained.  MICC offices need to further scrutinize their 
justifications to increase the use of competition in service contracts at all MICC offices. 
Additionally, the use of IGEs was lacking, although IGEs serve as a valuable tool for 
ensuring fair and reasonable pricing and thus protecting the government’s interests. 
We also recommend that future procurements that involve recurring or non-severable 
services utilize options or award terms, such as an incentive, to motivate contractors, instead 
of exercising options only to save time from awarding another contract.  
Next, we recommend further evaluation of the number of modifications per contract 
to determine whether there is any possibility of reducing the number of modifcations for 
service types R and S in order to ease unecessary burdens on contracting personnel. The 
restructuring and management practices of the MICC centers normally drive administrative 
changes, and if not managed correctly, these practices, which are valuable resources, increase 
the workload for contracting personnel.  In order to avoid numerous modifications that could 
potentially drive up costs, requirements should be defined as early and as clearly as possible 
during the acquisiton planning phase.  Although the data suggests a relationship between the 
two factors other non-service types, related factors might share a relationship with the 
number of contract modifications. 
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For the relationships proven between service type and management practices, we 
have several recommendations as well.  We recommend that MICC offices further analyze 
the causes for the lack of an IGE in contract files and the associated impact on acquisition 
performance. 
We also emphatically recommend proper contract documentation and filing.  
Maintaining accurate records aids in the administration of contracts, as well as in providing 
proper historical documentation in the event of a protest.  With the workload placed on the 
acquisition workforce today, it is important that files be organized and complete to enable 
contracting personnel to research contracts and find information quickly for historical 
information or clarification of issues.   
Our overall recommendation is for MICC offices to use the findings of this study to 
take a deeper look into the administration and management of service contracts.  Contracted 
services are vital to installation operations and impact the mission and training of resident 
units and soldiers.  Additionally, it is important for MICC offices to fulfill their role as public 
policy enforcers and stewards of taxpayer dollars.  Buying services is essential, and 
personnel at MICC offices must ensure that customers receive the best value to meet mission 
needs.   
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although we have indicated common shortfalls in the acquisition process at the 
MICC level, we recommend further analysis of additional MICC offices and of the four 
specific service type contracts that we presented in this research.  By increasing the sample 
size and providing a more rigorous statistical analysis, possibly by utilizing a form of 
regression, future studies may achieve more definitive results.  While regulations and 
guidance exist for standard contracting administrative practices, the practices we observed in 
this study were not uniform.  Because of this lack of uniformity, a study is needed to 
highlight these trends on a larger scale that includes all DOCs and MICC offices across the 
Army. 
We also recommend further research into the effect of incorporating program 
managers at the installation level, specifically for service contracts.  The expertise and 
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knowledge that program managers gain at the system level would prove useful at the 
installation level, especially for high-value recurring contracts.  Applying the perspective of a 
program manager to the acquisition of an installation-wide service contract could prove 
beneficial in terms of cost savings and overall better support to the customer, as well as 
protecting the government’s interests. 
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE DATA COLLECTION FORMS 
Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command Services Acquisition 
Data Collection Form (Part I) 
 
1. Office ________________ 
 
2. Contract number and title 
________________ 
 
3. What type of service is this contract (mark all that apply)? 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (R) 
Data Processing and Telecommunications (D) 
Maintenance and Repair of Equipment (J) 
Utilities and Housekeeping (S) 
 
4. What approach was the contract solicited through? 
Competitively Bid (Full and Open)      
Sole Source 
Other (please specify):__________ 
 
5. What was the type of contract awarded for this service? 
Fixed-price      
Cost-reimbursable      
Other (please specify):__________ 
 
6. What incentive/award type does this contract include? 
Incentive Fee      
Award Fee      
Award Term      
Other (please specify):__________ 
 




8. How many modifications were there and what were the reasons for each one? 
________________ 
 
9. Was an independent government estimate (IGE) included and what was the value? 
IGE – Yes/No 
Value_______ 
10. What was the award basis for this contract? 
Lowest-Price Technically-Acceptable (LPTA) 
Best-Value (e.g. use of trade-off analysis) 
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Other (please specify):__________ 
  
11. Was a Project Team Approach used in the acquisition of this service contract? 
Yes    
No   
 
12. How many people in the following positions are assigned to this service contract? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 
13. Who leads the acquisition of this service contract? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 
14. Who generates and decides changes to the service requirements? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  
 
 
15. Who performs the surveillance of this service contract? 
Contracting Officer (PCO, ACO, CO)____ 
Contract Specialist____ 
Project Manager____ 
Contracting Officer Representative (COR)____ 
Quality-assurance Evaluator (QAE)___    
Customer (unit which requested requirement)___        
Other (please explain)____  











17. Were the following items documented in the contract file? 
Acquisition plan – Yes/No 
Statement of work (SOW) / Performance Work Statement (PWS) – Yes/No 
Pricing analysis – Yes/No 
Price negotiation memorandum (PNM) – Yes/No 
Quality Assurance Plan (QASP) – Yes/No 
Closeout letter – Yes/No 
 
18. Other comments not covered by questions above? 
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Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command Services Acquisition 
Data Collection Form (Part II) 
 
When answering below questions, only consider the service contracts element of the 
command. 
 
1. Office ___________________ 
 
2. How many service contracts were awarded for FY10 in the following services? 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (R) ____ 
Data Processing and Telecommunications (D) ____ 
Maintenance and Repair of Equipment (J)____ 
Utilities and Housekeeping (S)____ 
 
3. What was the total dollar value awarded in FY10 for the following services? 
Professional, Administrative, and Management Support (R) ____ 
Data Processing and Telecommunications (D) ____ 
Maintenance and Repair of Equipment (J)____ 
Utilities and Housekeeping (S)____ 
 
4. What was the annual budget for the government service contracts staff in FY10? 
______________ 
 
5. How many billets are authorized for the following positions? 
Contracting Officers/Contract Specialists (Warranted)_____ 




6. How many authorized billets are filled for the following positions? 
Contracting Officers/Contract Specialists (Warranted)_____ 




7. What are the number of contracting personnel Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) certified in the following levels? 
DAWIA Level I (authorized____, filled____, trained____) 
DAWIA Level II (authorized____, filled____, trained____) 
DAWIA Level III (authorized____, filled____, trained____) 
 
8. How many Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) / Quality Assurance 
Evaluators (QAE) are COR/QAE certified? 
COR____  
QAE____ 
9. How many contracting officers / contract specialists have the following time of 
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Beyond 36 months 
 





Beyond 36 months 
 





Beyond 36 months 
 





Beyond 36 months 
 
13. What is the average number of service contracts that a person in each of the 
following positions manages? 
Contracting officers____ 
Contract specialists (1102)_____ 
Project managers (1101)_____ 
QAE____ 
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APPENDIX B. CHI-SQUARED CALCULATIONS 




D 18 16 34
J 18 11 29
R 27 22 49
S 23 19 42









Firm ‐Fixed  Price Cost Reimbursable TOTAL
D 34 0 34
J 29 0 29
R 49 0 49
S 42 0 42













D 0 34 34
J 0 29 29
R 0 49 49
S 1 41 42








C o n t i n g e n c y  T a b l e
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 1 2 2 2 3 4
J 6 2 3 2 9
R 2 3 2 6 4 9
S 2 7 1 5 4 2
T O T A L 6 8 8 6 1 5 4
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  S t a t 1 4 . 6 1 4 7
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e    0 . 0 0 2 2
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  C r i t i c a l   7 . 8 1 4 7




Option  Funding Admin Termination Novation Supplemental TOTAL
D 16 21 19 0 1 0 57
J 20 40 21 0 0 0 81
R 30 113 70 1 2 2 218
S 27 108 39 0 0 0 174
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Contingency Table
LPTA Direct Award Ability One Best Value Urgent/Compelling Only Provider TOTAL
D 17 8 0 1 2 6 34
J 16 4 1 2 2 4 29
R 18 13 0 9 3 6 49
S 18 7 7 4 4 2 42








2. Service Type and Management Practices 
 
C o n t i n g e n c y  T a b l e
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 2 7 7 3 4
J 1 6 1 3 2 9
R 2 0 2 9 4 9
S 2 3 1 9 4 2
T O T A L 8 6 6 8 1 5 4
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  S t a t 1 2 . 1 7 1 5
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e     0 . 0 0 6 8
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  C r i t i c a l   7 . 8 1 4 7
U s e  o f   I G E s  b y  S e r v i c e  T y p e
  
Continge ncy  Tab le
U nder $100K O ver $100K TOTA L
IGE  N o 62 24 86
IGE  Yes 29 39 68
TOTA L 91 63 154
ch i ‐square d  S tat 13.6206
d f 1
p ‐value    0.0002
ch i ‐square d  Critica l   3.8415
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C o n t i n g e n c y  T a b l e
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 1 8 1 6 3 4
J 1 0 1 9 2 9
R 1 9 3 0 4 9
S 1 4 2 8 4 2
T O T A L 6 1 9 3 1 5 4
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  S t a t 3 . 5 5 0 8
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e     0 . 3 1 4 2
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  C r i t i c a l   7 . 8 1 4 7
T e a m  A p p r o a c h
  
Contingency Table
1 2 3 4 5 6 8 TOTAL
D 2 10 14 2 6 0 0 34
J 2 2 20 5 0 0 29
R 0 9 25 8 5 1 1 49
S 0 13 14 4 9 0 2 42







C o n t in g e n cy  Tab le
C o n t ra c t  S p e c ia lis t C o n t ra c t in g  O f f ic e r TO TA L
D 2 32 34
J 5 24 29
R 0 49 49
S 1 41 42
TO TA L 8 146 154
ch i ‐ s q u a re d  S ta t 11 .938
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e    0 .0076
ch i ‐ s q u a re d  C r i t i ca l   7 .8147
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Contingency Table
1 2 3 8 TOTAL
D 7 26 1 0 34
J 6 16 7 0 29
R 4 40 5 0 49
S 3 32 6 1 42








1 2 3 4 5 6 8 TOTAL
D 3 15 15 1 0 0 0 34
J 4 7 15 3 0 0 0 29
R 0 17 24 8 0 0 0 49
S 1 17 19 2 1 1 1 42







C o n t in g e n c y  T a b le
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 1 1 2 3 3 4
J 1 5 1 4 2 9
R 2 6 2 3 4 9
S 2 5 1 7 4 2
T O T A L 7 7 7 7 1 5 4
ch i ‐ s q u a re d  S t a t 5 .9 7 7 3
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e    0 .1 1 2 7
c h i ‐ s q u a re d  C r i t i c a l   7 .8 1 4 7
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C o n t i n g e n c y  T a b l e
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 2 0 1 4 3 4
J 2 0 9 2 9
R 3 0 1 9 4 9
S 2 2 2 0 4 2
T O T A L 9 2 6 2 1 5 4
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  S t a t 2 . 0 2 8 7
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e     0 . 5 6 6 5
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  C r i t i c a l   7 . 8 1 4 7
D o c u m e n t a t i o n  ( A c q  P l a n )
  
C o n t i n g e n c y  T a b l e
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 1 2 2 2 3 4
J 7 2 2 2 9
R 1 2 3 7 4 9
S 1 1 3 1 4 2
T O T A L 4 2 1 1 2 1 5 4
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  S t a t 1 . 4 6 2 7
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e     0 . 6 9 0 9
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  C r i t i c a l   7 . 8 1 4 7
D o c u m e n t a t i o n  ( P W S )
  
C o n t in g e n cy  T a b le
N o Y e s TO TA L
D 16 18 34
J 13 16 29
R 16 33 49
S 18 24 42
TO TA L 63 91 154
ch i ‐ s q u a re d  S ta t 2 .1 637
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e    0 .5 391
ch i ‐ s q u a re d  C r i t i c a l   7 .8 147
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C o n t i n g e n c y  T a b l e
N o Y e s T O T A L
D 2 7 7 3 4
J 1 8 1 1 2 9
R 2 2 2 7 4 9
S 2 1 2 1 4 2
T O T A L 8 8 6 6 1 5 4
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  S t a t 1 1 . 0 4 7 2
d f 3
p ‐ v a l u e     0 . 0 1 1 5
c h i ‐ s q u a r e d  C r i t i c a l   7 . 8 1 4 7
D o c u m e n t a t i o n  ( Q A  P l a n )
  
Con tin ge n cy  Tab le
N o Yes N /A TO TA L
D 15 3 16 34
J 16 2 11 29
R 20 1 28 49
S 17 1 24 42
TO TA L 68 7 79 154
ch i ‐ sq u are d  S tat 5.6156
d f 6
p ‐v a lu e    0.4676
ch i ‐ sq u are d  C ri t i ca l   12.5916
Do cum e n tatio n  (C lo se ou t  Le tte r)
  
Contingency Table
No Yes N/A TOTAL
D 19 8 7 34
J 22 4 3 29
R 26 18 5 49
S 18 14 10 42
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2003 - 2011 SPONSORED RESEARCH TOPICS 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
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Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
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 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
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